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Abstract
Individuals with autism often violate social rules and have lower accuracy in identifying and explaining inappropriate social
behavior. Twelve children with autism (AD) and thirteen children with typical development (TD) participated in this fMRI
study of the neurofunctional basis of social judgment. Participants indicated in which of two pictures a boy was being bad
(Social condition) or which of two pictures was outdoors (Physical condition). In the within-group Social–Physical
comparison, TD children used components of mentalizing and language networks [bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG),
bilateral medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and bilateral posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS)], whereas AD children used
a network that was primarily right IFG and bilateral pSTS, suggesting reduced use of social and language networks during
this social judgment task. A direct group comparison on the Social–Physical contrast showed that the TD group had greater
mPFC, bilateral IFG, and left superior temporal pole activity than the AD group. No regions were more active in the AD
group than in the group with TD in this comparison. Both groups successfully performed the task, which required minimal
language. The groups also performed similarly on eyetracking measures, indicating that the activation results probably
reflect the use of a more basic strategy by the autism group rather than performance disparities. Even though language was
unnecessary, the children with TD recruited language areas during the social task, suggesting automatic encoding of their
knowledge into language; however, this was not the case for the children with autism. These findings support behavioral
research indicating that, whereas children with autism may recognize socially inappropriate behavior, they have difficulty
using spoken language to explain why it is inappropriate. The fMRI results indicate that AD children may not automatically
use language to encode their social understanding, making expression and generalization of this knowledge more difficult.
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Introduction
Autism has three key characteristics: impairments in social
interactions, reduced communication skills, and restricted interests
and repetitive behaviors [1]. Of these, the social abnormalities are
unique to autism [1,2]. In Kanner’s original description [2], he
detailed a number of socially inappropriate behaviors, including
playing alongside rather than with others, a preference for
aloneness and an indifference to others, neither asking nor
answering questions, and pushing people away. Individuals with
autism may show increased levels of interpersonal aggression (e.g.,
[3,4]); deficits in emotional regulation [5], including high levels of
tantrums [6,7]; as well as reduced positive interaction behaviors
[8].
In addition to having a more difficult time acting appropriately
in interpersonal contexts, children with autism perform poorly
when they have to judge the behaviors of others. A number of
behavioral studies have investigated various aspects of social
judgments in children with autism. Using videotaped vignettes
with varying numbers of social cues, Pierce and colleagues [9]
asked children whether characters were mean or nice and whether
they acted appropriately. The responses of the children with
autism were compared to two groups matched on verbal mental
age: younger children with typical development and age-matched
children with mental retardation. The children with autism
performed worse on the social questions, particularly as the
number of cues that required attention increased, but performed
as well as the other groups of children on factual questions.
Similarly, in another study, high-functioning children with autism
or Asperger syndrome performed more poorly than children with
typical development on identifying faux pas in auditorily-presented
stories, despite equivalent performance on false belief tasks [10].
Loveland and colleagues [11] created a task for discriminating
between appropriate and inappropriate behavior that also
modulated whether the videos used verbal or nonverbal cues.
The children and adolescents with autism had more difficulty
correctly identifying inappropriate verbal behaviors than the
children with typical development. Moreover, they gave unusual
reasoning for their selections. In another study, older children with
autism were asked to make moral judgments about deliberate or
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accidental actions against people or property [12]. The children
with autism performed similarly to children with typical develop-
ment and children with learning difficulties when determining that
motive and consequences were important. However, the children
with autism were unable to verbally justify their reasoning in the
majority of cases, and the appropriateness of justifications
correlated with verbal mental age in the children with autism
but not the children with typical development [13]. In a recent
study, when 9- to 13-year-old children with autism rated the social
appropriateness of a range of stories, they rated more normal
behaviors as strange than did the children with typical develop-
ment, even though the two groups performed equivalently on
inappropriate behaviors [14]. Additionally, the children with
autism provided more bizarre explanations and refusals to answer
(e.g., ‘‘I don’t know’’ or silence) than the comparison group. In
summary, children with autism often have difficulty making social
judgments accurately, and even when they are successful, they
often cannot verbally justify their answers.
Multiple mechanisms have been proposed to underlie this
unusual performance. One suggestion is that it is a function of
underlying deficits in attention, given poorer performance with
increased numbers of cues [9]. Some research [11,14] has
implicated abnormal language processing as a possible explanation
for poor performance because of the reduced ability to verbally
explain judgments. The correlation of verbal mental age in
children with autism with the quality of their justifications [12]
further suggests that impaired language skills could be an
important factor in the difficulty children with autism have in
making social judgments about the behavior of others. If the
difference is related to language skills, the assumption would be
that the reduced overall accuracy in certain social judgment tasks
reflects the necessity of language use in those tasks even when
measures other than verbal justification are used.
However, theory of mind could also be an important factor in
making social judgments. Theory of mind, or mentalizing, is the
ability to recognize that other individuals have thoughts, beliefs,
desires, and other mental states that are distinct from one’s own
[15]. To interpret the behavior of others in context, it is often
important to understand their thoughts and motivation. Behav-
ioral studies have long suggested that there is reduced mentalizing
ability in autism (e.g., [16,17]), which would then affect their
ability to make social judgments. Additionally, recent research has
demonstrated mentalizing impairments in young children with
autism even when language is not required for the theory-of-mind
task [18], suggesting independence of the two processes.
Theory of mind is believed to rely upon the medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC), posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS),
temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and temporal poles (for reviews,
see [19,20]). Many neuroimaging studies have shown reduced
activation in key theory-of-mind brain regions in individuals with
autism (e.g., [10,21–25]). Mentalizing regions have also been
found to support tasks other than those strictly pertaining to theory
of mind. This includes awareness of the appropriateness of others’
facial expressions in context [26], irony understanding during
mismatches between words and context [27], moral judgments
[28–30], empathy [31], emotional self-assessment [32], and
violations of social norms [33,34]. Some research has indicated
that these mentalizing brain regions show reduced specialization in
autism, even during tasks that do not strictly require mentalizing
per se [27,32]. Taken together, these findings in people with
typical development and with autism suggest that the mentalizing
network might also underlie additional tasks that show behavioral
deficits in children with autism, such as identifying good and bad
behaviors in others.
The purpose of the current study was to use fMRI to examine
the brain mechanisms that underlie the previous reports of unusual
behaviors of children with autism when making social judgments.
More specifically, we wanted to elucidate the cognitive processes
that were being used by the children with autism and the children
with typical development when making these types of judgments
by examining the concurrent patterns of brain activation. We
created a nonverbal task in which children with autism and typical
development viewed a pair of images and had to make either a
social judgment or a physical judgment. We elected to do a
physical judgment task for comparison because children with
autism do not typically show deficits in these tasks behaviorally
[35,36], suggesting preserved ability. We hypothesized that the
children with autism would show an unusual pattern of brain
activity during the social judgment task, given the aforementioned
deficits on other social tasks, but relatively similar activity while
making physical judgments. Further, we investigated viewing
patterns of the stimuli with eyetracking to determine whether the
two groups of participants used the same visual information to
make decisions. As required for interpretation of fMRI data, the
task was designed so that all of the children were able to do it well;
thus, any differences in brain activity could be attributed to neural
strategy rather than performance. Another advantage of this task
was that it did not inherently require a large amount of linguistic
processing, making it possible to examine cognitive processing
when making a social judgment alone rather than including the
translation of that process into spoken language.
Methods
Participants
Participants’ guardians provided written consent and partici-
pants provided written assent for this study, which was approved
by the Institutional Review Boards at Carnegie Mellon University,
the University of Pittsburgh, and Duquesne University. Partici-
pants were recruited from the pool of participants maintained by
the Autism Center for Excellence Subject Core at the University of
Pittsburgh; initial diagnostic and characterization testing of
participants was performed by the Subject Core to establish
eligibility for participation in research studies. Twelve children
with autism (ages 8 to 16 years) and thirteen typically developing
children (ages 7 to 15 years) were included in all the data analyses
for this fMRI study. The two groups did not significantly differ in
age and Full Scale, Verbal or Performance IQ (p..05), as
determined by administration of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scales
of Intelligence (WASI; [37]). (See Table 1 for participant details.)
An additional five children with autism and nine children with
typical development were scanned but excluded from analyses due
to low task performance (three with autism, one with typical
development) or excessive head motion.
Autism diagnoses were based on the Autism Diagnostic
Interview—Revised [38,39], the Autism Diagnostic Observation
Schedule [40], and expert clinical opinion. Potential participants
with autism were excluded from recruitment into the larger
participant pool if they had an identifiable cause for their autism,
such as Fragile X syndrome, fetal cytomegalovirus infection, or
tuberous sclerosis, or if they were found to have evidence of
prematurity, head injury, birth asphyxia, or a seizure disorder.
Exclusions were based on neurologic history and examination,
physical examination, and chromosomal analysis or metabolic
testing, if indicated. Potential control participants were screened
by questionnaire, telephone, face-to-face interview, and observa-
tion during initial testing and were excluded if they had a current
or past history of prematurity, birth injury, developmental delay,
fMRI of Social Judgment in Autism
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psychiatric or neurologic disorders, school problems, learning
disabilities, acquired brain injury, or medical disorders with
implications for the central nervous system. Exclusionary criteria
for controls also included a history in first degree relatives of
autism, developmental cognitive disorder, learning disability,
schizophrenia, obsessive compulsive disorder, anxiety disorder,
affective disorder, or other neurologic or psychiatric disorder
thought to have a genetic component. Handedness was deter-
mined through administration of the Edinburgh Handedness
Inventory [41]. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Scanning
This block design fMRI experiment was performed using a
3 Tesla Siemens Allegra head-only scanner with 50-mT/m
gradients (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany). Parallel imaging was
performed using an 8-channel head coil. Participants’ heads were
immobilized using tape and foam pillows, and all participants
underwent a preliminary practice session in a mock scanner to
ensure that they understood how to remain still. Two hundred
twenty-four T1-weighted anatomical images were acquired using
an MPRAGE sequence (TR=1630 ms, TE=2.48 ms;
FOV=20.4 cm; a=8u; image matrix = 2562; voxel si-
ze = 0.860.860.8 mm) to be later used for coregistration with
the functional data. These structural images were aligned in the
near-axial plane defined by the anterior and posterior commis-
sures. Co-planar, whole-brain functional images were acquired
using an echoplanar imaging sequence sensitive to blood
oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) contrast (TR=1000 ms;
TE= 25 ms; a=60u; FOV=200 mm; image matrix = 642; voxel
size 3.163.165 mm; 20 axial slices). Two discarded RF excita-
tions ensuring steady-state equilibrium preceded the collection of
393 successive brain volumes.
Image preprocessing was performed in SPM 2. Images were
corrected for slice acquisition timing and motion, normalized to
the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space, isovoxeled, and
smoothed with an 8 mm Gaussian kernel to reduce noise.
Individual and group analyses were performed using a general
linear model and Gaussian random field theory [42]. For the
random-effects group analyses, statistical maps were overlaid on
normalized T1-weighted images. A threshold of t = 4.01 (p= .001)
was used for within-group analyses and a threshold of t = 2.81
(p = .005) was used for between-group analyses, all with a
minimum extent of six voxels.
Stimuli
Participants viewed stimuli on a projection screen inside of the
scanner using a mirror placed above the eyes. For each of the 32
trials, participants viewed two images from the ‘‘Goofus and
Gallant’’ cartoons previously published in Highlights for Children [43]
that had been provided to us and used with the permission of that
magazine. Children were instructed to attend to the blond-haired
boy in each image. In half of the trials, they were asked in which
picture the blond-haired boy was being bad, or doing something
that he was not supposed to do (Social condition). In the other half,
the children had to indicate which picture took place outside
(Physical condition). A symbol (a red circle with diagonal line
through it for ‘‘bad’’ or a sun for ‘‘outside’’) appeared at the
beginning of a block to signal what type of question was to be
answered. Then, two images were displayed for 4,000 ms. Next,
the symbol appeared again below the two pictures with pictures of
two hands on separate computer mice to signal that it was time to
respond while the pictures remained onscreen for another
4,000 ms. Trials were organized into eight blocks, four of Social
choices and four of Physical choices. The blocks were presented in
sets of two for each condition to reduce the effects of task
switching. All stimuli were counterbalanced for left and right
answer choices. Paired frames were matched for the number of
faces visible. Each block contained an instruction slide that was
presented for 3,750 ms, four trials for a total of 32,000 ms, and
four interstimulus pauses of 750 ms. A 16,000-ms fixation
occurred between blocks. The total scan time was approximately
8.5 minutes.
Before the block presentation in the scan session, participants
underwent an instruction and practice session at the beginning of
the scan for 48,000 ms. They also performed a preliminary
practice session of three Social and three Physical trials outside the
scanner. Experimenters ensured that the children understood and
could adhere to the instructions during the preliminary practice
session outside of the scanner. As described earlier, three
additional participants with autism and one with typical develop-
ment, who were unable to perform the task with accuracy at or
above 70%, were not included in any analyses.
Eyetracking
Outside of the scanner, 14 of the children (7 with autism, 7
typically developing) who were scanned successfully participated in
an eyetracking session, along with 6 (3 from each group) who were
scanned unsuccessfully (i.e., their fMRI data was not usable
because of excessive head motion or failure to complete the
Table 1. Demographic information for autism and control groups.
Autism (n=12) Control (n= 13) t value P1
Age (years) Mean 6 SD 13.0862.39 11.4662.63 0.99 0.33
Verbal IQ Mean 6 SD 111.42615.58 116.00610.68 0.86 0.40
Performance IQ Mean 6 SD 110.67615.51 113.85610.14 0.61 0.55
Full-scale IQ Mean 6 SD 112.08615.19 116.62610.28 0.88 0.39
Handedness R:L:A; Mean 6 SD 10:1:1 (.676.65) 13:0 (.986.06) 1.74 0.10
Gender Male:Female 9:3 11:2 0.65
ADOS Communication Mean 6 SD 3.836.94 N/A
ADOS Social Mean 6 SD 7.2561.22 N/A
ADOS Total Soc Comm Mean 6 SD 11.0861.31 N/A
1p value for gender was computed using the Fisher exact statistic; other p values were computed from the two-sample t test.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047241.t001
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paradigm). Eyetracking occurred after the fMRI session. This
follow-up study was performed to ensure that differences in brain
activity could not be attributed to differences in viewing patterns.
The stimuli were a subset consisting of 16 of the stimuli (8 Social, 8
Physical) used in the scanning session. Stimuli were presented
using Tobii ClearView Software (Tobii Technology, Danderyd,
Sweden) on a Tobii T60 eyetracking system (Tobii Technology,
Danderyd, Sweden) with a 17’’ monitor. This paradigm consisted
of two Social blocks alternated with two Physical blocks. Each
block consisted of four trials and was presented as follows:
4,000 ms original frame presentation, 4,000 ms display of the
frames with the pictures of the hands on the computer mice at the
bottom, then 2,000 ms fixation. Each stimulus image was shown at
32 degrees of visual angle horizontally and 24 degrees vertically.
Experimenters manually recorded the children’s answers. For
analysis, ROIs were drawn on the images. These were created for
each individual face and body in the picture as well as for
additional objects that were critical for determining behavior or
otherwise potentially interesting. The location, number, and
duration of fixations were recorded and analyzed.
Results
Behavioral performance
We performed repeated-measures ANOVAs to examine per-
formance differences between the two groups. There was no
difference in overall accuracy between the groups [F(1,23) = .00,
p = .990], but there was a main effect of condition
[F(1,23) = 38.87, p,.001]; both groups were more accurate in
the Physical condition than in the Social condition. There was no
significant interaction between group and condition
[F(1,23) = 1.75, p = .199]. For the reaction time, there was no
difference between the groups [F(1,23) = .442, p = .513], but there
was a main effect of condition [F(1,23) = 64.51, p,.0001]; both
groups were faster to respond in the Physical condition. Again, no
significant interaction between group and condition was identified
[F(1,23) = .199, p= .660].
fMRI
For a list of all peaks in activity, see Tables S1 and S2.
Typically developing group. All reported within-group
comparisons were significant at p,.001. When Physical and
Social conditions were combined and compared to fixation, there
was increased activity in bilateral pars triangularis extending into
pars opercularis (including Broca’s area), middle frontal gyrus
(MFG), occipital cortex extending into pSTS, and supplementary
motor area (SMA); left inferior and middle temporal gyrus (ITG/
MTG) and left precentral gyrus. When Physical alone was
compared to fixation, there was increased activity in bilateral
IFG including pars triangularis (Broca’s area), insula, SMA, and
MFG; left pre- and postcentral gyri and Rolandic operculum; and
right putamen and superior frontal gyrus (SFG). Greater activity
was found in response to Social than to fixation in bilateral
occipital cortex into pSTS, Broca’s area, MFG, and SMA; left
caudate, MTG, precentral gyrus, superior medial frontal cortex,
and thalamus; and right SFG. The Physical condition elicited a
greater response than the Social condition in bilateral middle
cingulum, Rolandic operculum, and SMA; left inferior parietal
lobe (IPL), MFG, and pre- and postcentral gyri; and right
precentral gyrus. The reverse comparison, where Social was
greater than Physical, showed higher activity in bilateral Broca’s
area, superior medial frontal gyrus (medial frontal cortex), fusiform
gyrus (FFG), MTG into pSTS, caudate, hippocampus, occipital
cortex, and precuneus; and right cingulum, MFG, and precentral
gyrus (Figure 1A).
Autism group. The combined response to Physical and
Social conditions resulted in increased bilateral MFG, occipital
cortex (extending into pSTS only in the right hemisphere),
precuneus, and SMA; left amygdala, aMTG, caudate, and pre-
and postcentral gyri; and right IFG, SFG, and superior parietal
lobule (SPL). The Physical condition response was greater than
that to fixation in bilateral MFG, occipital cortex (into right pSTS
only), pre- and postcentral gyrus, SPL, and SMA; left amygdala,
caudate, MTG, putamen, and Rolandic operculum; and right
middle cingulum, parahippocampal gyrus, precuneus, SFG, and
thalamus. When comparing the Social condition to fixation,
activity was greater in the bilateral occipital cortex (extending into
bilateral pSTS), precuneus, SMA, hippocampus, and insula; left
amygdala, operculum, and temporal pole; and right pars
triangularis, precentral gyrus, putamen, SFG, and SPL. The
response to Physical was greater than to Social in bilateral
cingulum, insula, postcentral gyrus, precentral gyrus, SMA, and
supramarginal gyrus; and left IPL and MFG. The Social condition
elicited a greater response than the Physical condition in bilateral
occipital cortex, pSTS/MTG, and SPL; left FFG, insula, and
superior temporal pole; and right MFG and pars triangularis
within the IFG (Figure 1B).
Group comparisons. All reported results for the between-
group comparisons were significant at p,.005. For the combined
conditions greater than fixation comparison, the response in the
Figure 1. Activation maps for (a) Typically developing (TD)
participants: Social – Physical; (b) Participants with Autism
(AD): Social – Physical; and (c) TD – AD, Social – Physical. The IFG
is circled in aqua, and the pSTS is circled in magenta.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047241.g001
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typical development group was greater than that of the autism
group in bilateral IFG, right MFG, and left insula. The autism
group showed a greater response than the typically developing
group in this comparison in bilateral occipital cortex, right STG,
and right middle cingulum. When the Physical condition was
compared to fixation, the typical development group demonstrat-
ed higher levels of activity than the autism group in the right
precentral gyrus, right MFG and IFG at the pars orbitalis, and left
SPL, and the autism group had higher activity than the typical
development group in bilateral anterior cingulate and occipital
cortex, and left MTG, amygdala, MFG, and an area of IFG at the
pars orbitalis not seen in our other analyses. For Social greater
than fixation, the typical development group showed greater
activity than the autism group in bilateral IFG (pars triangularis
and orbitalis) and insula; left superior temporal pole, MTG,
pallidum, hippocampus, and caudate; and right MFG. The
response in the autism group was greater than that of the typical
development group in bilateral occipital cortex and right
precentral and postcentral gyri, middle cingulum, STG, and
MFG.
The typical development group had greater activity than the
autism group to Physical than Social in the right MFG, inferior
temporal gyrus (ITG), precentral gyrus, and SMA as well as left
occipital cortex and IPL. (See Figure 1C.) For the Social greater
than Physical comparison, our primary contrast of interest, the
children with typical development showed greater responses than
the children with autism in bilateral IFG at pars triangularis
(Broca’s area), aSTS/MTG, insula and anterior cingulate as well
as left hippocampus, superior temporal pole, pallidum, cuneus,
IFG at the pars orbitalis, and precuneus. There were no areas in
which the brain activation of the autism group was greater than
that of the group with typical development.
Eyetracking results
Eyetracking was performed on 14 of the participants (seven
from each group) who were successfully scanned as well as an
additional six participants who were unsuccessfully scanned (three
from each diagnostic group) on a subset of the paradigm stimuli
outside of the scanner, for a total of ten eyetracking participants
per group. There were no group differences for the percentage of
task time spent focused on the entire task (including stimuli,
instructions, and fixation slides) (mean typical development
group= 96.49%, mean autism group= 94.5%, t(18) = 0.67,
p = 0.51), the Physical stimuli (mean typical development
group= 37.72%, mean autism group=36.67%, t(18) = 1.21,
p = 0.24), and the Social stimuli (mean typical development
group= 38.15%, mean autism group=37.70%, t(18) = 0.65,
p = 0.52). The eyetracking results suggest that the fMRI activation
findings cannot be attributed to overall attention to the stimuli and
the task.
Next, we examined how much time the participants spent
looking at the individuals in the images who were taking part in
the action of the scene (henceforth called Actors). These
calculations are reported as a percentage of the time during
which stimuli were on the screen. The children with autism had a
statistically non-significant trend towards spending less time
viewing the Actors than the children with typical development
did throughout the task (mean typical development
group= 46.68%, mean autism group=41.09%, t(18) = 1.83,
p = 0.08). This appeared to arise from a difference in viewing
patterns during the Physical stimuli (mean typical development
group= 23.65%, mean autism group=20.13%, t(18) = 1.96,
p = 0.07) rather than the Social stimuli (mean typical development
group= 23.03%, mean autism group=20.96%, t(18) = 1.31,
p = 0.21). Given that the Physical task can be done without
reference to the individuals in the images, this suggests that the
children with typical development may look more at the actors
than the children with autism do when it is unnecessary to do so,
although the difference was not statistically reliable. The
proportion of stimulus viewing time spent on actors’ heads was
greater for the typical development group than the autism group
for the full task (mean typical development group=27.82%, mean
autism group=16.99%, t(18) = 2.32, p= 0.03) as well as the
Physical and Social conditions (Physical: mean typical develop-
ment group= 12.84%, mean autism group= 7.81%, t(18) = 2.05,
p = 0.05; Social: mean typical development group= 14.98%, mean
autism group= 9.19%, t(18) = 2.46, p = 0.02). No trends were
found in the amount of time spent viewing actors’ bodies for the
full task or the Physical condition (p.0.20); however, there was a
statistically non-significant trend towards greater viewing of actors’
bodies by the autism group in the Social task (mean typical
development group= 8.05%, mean autism group= 11.78%,
t(18) = 1.85, p= 0.08). No differences were found between groups
for the amount of time spent viewing critical regions—those
necessary for determining the answer—in any condition (all
p.0.25). (See Figure 2.)
We would predict that the viewing differences for the heads and
bodies, if significantly driving brain responses, would be reflected
in higher activity levels in the fusiform gyrus, particularly the
fusiform face area (e.g., [44]) and fusiform body area [45], as well
as the extrastriate body area [46]. However, between-group
differences in these regions were not identified. Moreover, the
differences that were identified were not in regions typically
implicated in face processing, body processing, or overall
attention. Together, these results suggest that the differences in
brain activity are not likely to be a result of differential viewing
patterns between the two groups of children.
Discussion
When performing social versus physical judgments, the children
with typical development had relatively higher levels of brain
activity in social cognition and language areas, including bilateral
mPFC (within the medial frontal cortex, MFC), IFG, FFG, and
pSTS. However, the children with autism did not show this same
pattern of increased activity in the mPFC, left IFG, or left FFG,
despite similar activity to that seen in the children with typical
development in subregions of right IFG, right FFG, and bilateral
pSTS. The group with typical development had a significantly
stronger differential response to the social scenarios than the group
with autism in a subset of social and language areas, including the
mPFC, left superior temporal pole, bilateral IFG at the pars
triangularis, and the left IFG at the pars orbitalis. These
differences occurred despite similar accuracy in identifying the
inappropriate social behavior in both groups; therefore, the
differences in activation did not result from differences in the
accuracy of responses. In addition, the results of a follow-up
eyetracking study suggest that the activation differences are not
likely being driven purely by different gaze patterns between
groups. The typically developing group did have greater looking
time to faces than the autism group, but the activation differences
were not in areas traditionally associated with face processing.
Overall, the fMRI findings indicate that a reduced subset of the
mentalizing and language networks is sufficient for accurate
performance on this relatively easy set of social and physical
judgment tasks and that this functioning is preserved in children
with autism, with typically developing children recruiting more
brain regions than are strictly necessary to accomplish the
fMRI of Social Judgment in Autism
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processing task. Thus, the children with autism appear to have
used a neural strategy that was a subcomponent of that used by the
children with typical development rather than a novel, alternative
strategy. The additional brain regions recruited by the children
with typical development are ones that represent traditional social
and language areas, suggesting that, unlike the children with
autism, the children with typical development were automatically
encoding their social knowledge into language. Although activity
patterns were similar in the groups with typical development and
autism in some social brain regions, different patterns of processing
were observed in others, including the mPFC, left superior
temporal pole, and bilateral IFG. The MFC, which contains the
mPFC, has been implicated in social cognition broadly as well as
mentalizing and has been functionally divided into posterior
rostral (pr), anterior rostral (ar), and orbital subregions (o) (for
review, see [47]). We found differences across groups between the
Social and Physical conditions in the arMFC. This area of the
MFC has been implicated in theory of mind (e.g., [19,21,48–50]),
empathy [31], violations of social norms [33,34], morality (e.g.,
[28–30]; for review, see [51]), appropriateness of facial expressions
[26], and person perception and monitoring [52–54]. Moreover, it
has previously been shown to have unusual activity patterns during
tasks requiring theory of mind in adults with autism [21,55] and
irony comprehension in children with autism [27]. It has been
suggested that the regional cerebral blood flow is abnormal in
general for medial prefrontal cortex in autism, and that this
correlates with communication and social interaction scores [56].
We provide further evidence of abnormal activity patterns in this
region in children with autism that are consistent with the previous
research in both adults and children; at the same time, we provide
additional understanding of the role of this region in a new task of
social judgment.
In addition to the social and language regions about which we
had hypotheses, the left superior temporal pole showed differences
between the two groups. In typically developing individuals, the
temporal poles have been implicated in a number of social
processes, including mentalizing (e.g., [19,31,48–50,57]), empa-
thizing [31], inferring the emotional states of others, and
understanding socially important narratives (for review, see [58]).
The left temporal pole is involved in moral judgments [28,59] and
analyzing the appropriateness of facial expressions in context [26].
Finally, the bilateral temporal pole is also more active when
reading stories that involve social norm violations relative to
normal stories, suggesting that this region is involved in analyzing
the appropriateness of behavior [33]. Taken together, these and
other results have been interpreted to mean that the temporal
poles play an important role in making inferences about other
people’s feelings and behavior, perhaps by coupling high-level
perception with personal visceral emotion and semantic informa-
tion [58]. Abnormal temporal pole activity has been found in
adults with autism, and it has been suggested that the temporal
pole is a component of a key neural circuit that is impaired in
autism [60]. Additionally, the temporal pole does not deactivate
after resting state in individuals with autism, despite doing so in
typically developing individuals [61]. Recently, it has been shown
that bilateral temporal pole activity is abnormal when comparing
the response to happy and neutral faces in individuals with autism
as well as their siblings relative to typically developing individuals
Figure 2. Eyetracking results. Graphs of the mean percentages of time the participants fixated on segments of the stimuli relative to the total
amount of time they were present on the screen. Error bars denote standard deviations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047241.g002
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[62]. Our findings that the group with typical development
recruited the left superior temporal pole for the social condition
more than the group with autism also suggests a role for the
temporal pole in making simple social judgments in typically
developing individuals and provides further evidence for abnormal
function in this region in autism.
We also found differences in the activity patterns in both right
and left IFG. In typically developing individuals, right IFG has
been implicated as a mirror neuron region in which the neurons
fire both when the individual performs an action and when the
individual sees another person performing the same action (for
review, see [63]). Reduced activity in this area has been reported
for individuals with autism during social tasks (e.g., [64]). In
children with autism, similar findings have been reported for social
tasks (e.g., [65]) and social language processing [66]. Interestingly,
relatively increased activity in right IFG has been reported for
children with autism during irony comprehension, a result that
was interpreted as representing an increase in effortful processing
and possible use of a compensatory strategy [27]. Thus, our
finding that children with autism show reduced differentiation in
right IFG activity relative to typically developing children is
unsurprising; however, it is difficult to tease apart the separate
roles of linguistic and social processing in the task used in the
current study.
Left IFG is a language processing region, and several studies
have reported relatively reduced activation in this region in adults
with autism during language tasks (e.g., [67,68]). In the current
study, the relatively increased left IFG activation by the children
with typical development suggests that they were using language
processing even though the social judgment task did not explicitly
require them to do so. Prior fMRI research has found similar
differences in the use of language in individuals with autism, with
the comparison group activating language regions whereas the
autism group did not, even though they successfully performed the
task. For example, individuals with autism were reported to be less
likely to recruit brain regions involved in verbal processes during
memory tasks for letters [69] and faces [70]. Although verbal
processing is not strictly necessary for either task, typically
developing individuals recruited left IFG, whereas participants
with autism did not. Sahyoun and colleagues [71] used a picture
task where participants saw three images in a grid and had to
determine the fourth image from a set of choices. For each grid,
one of three types of strategies was possible: visuospatial, semantic,
or a hybrid visuospatial and semantic method. The typically
developing children used left IFG whenever semantic strategies
were available or necessary, whereas the children with autism
relied on posterior regions for all strategies. Additionally, the
children with autism showed reduced fronto-temporal connectiv-
ity. These studies suggest that there is automaticity of verbal
encoding in typically developing individuals that is reduced or
absent in individuals with autism.
A tendency not to automatically recruit linguistic encoding
could explain some of the previous behavioral results in which
children with autism were less accurate in identifying inappropri-
ate verbal behaviors [11] and offered bizarre explanations for their
responses [11,14]. Both research teams suggested that abnormal
language processing could be responsible for poor performance
[11,14]. Moreover, it is in line with anecdotal reports and case
studies from individuals with autism that they primarily rely on
nonverbal thought (e.g., [72]). For example, Temple Grandin
described her life with autism:
‘‘I think in pictures. Words are like a second language to me.
I translate both spoken and written words into full-color
movies, complete with sound, which run like a VCR tape in
my head. When somebody speaks to me, his words are
instantly translated into pictures’’ ([73], pg. 1).
Our findings provide further support that individuals with
autism, unlike typically developing individuals, do not automat-
ically use verbal strategies to complete tasks in which they are not
strictly necessary. That is, linguistic skills are not immediately
brought on line to assist with cognitive processing tasks. This
tendency can help explain the poorer performance seen in
individuals with autism on social judgment tasks that require
linguistic knowledge to respond accurately. It also helps to clarify
how accuracy is preserved for some tasks that do not require
language, while verbal justification remains poor.
This finding is particularly interesting in light of Gazzaniga’s
theory of language function derived from research on typically
developing individuals and split-brain patients. He proposed that
left hemisphere language regions (‘‘the interpreter’’) are automat-
ically engaged to interpret stimuli and assimilate them into
comprehensible events (e.g., [74]). This automatic self-storytelling
allows for elaboration and generalization of information such that
the left hemisphere is ‘‘drive[n] to create order from apparent
chaos’’ by providing a narrative and relating information to other
remembered events while the right hemisphere maintains a more
veridical record of events ([74], pg. 1319). Reports of split-brain
patients have supported this role of the left hemisphere in finding
patterns among stimuli (e.g., [75]). We hypothesize that this
function might be disrupted in autism spectrum disorders such that
no automatic storytelling or conversion of information into
linguistic form occurs, as evidenced by the reduced left IFG
activity found in this study. A disrupted tendency to create
narratives could result in reduced organization and comprehen-
sion of incoming stimuli and a lower ability to generalize across
situations because of reduced use of linguistic forms to promote
integration of past knowledge. The lack of a left hemisphere
‘‘interpreter’’ could account for the poor behavioral performance
in identifying and explaining behavioral judgments previously
reported [11,14].
The failure of individuals with autism to recode experiences into
language or to use language as a scaffold has been previously
proposed as an underlying cause for difficulty with recalling
experiences [76] and for difficulty with recalling the information
presented in pictures of everyday family scenes [77]. The lack of
automatic storytelling on the part of the children with autism may
explain both the necessity for and the success of the use of
intervention strategies such as social stories [78,79]. These
interventions do the work, in effect, that the brains of the children
with autism are not doing. Interestingly, the results in language
regions suggest that the storytelling process is more reduced in
autism relative to typical development for social than for nonsocial
judgments. These findings are consistent with the results reported
by Pierce and colleagues [9] in which children with autism
performed as well as verbal mental-aged matched and age-
matched children on answering factual questions but not social
questions. Future research is necessary to clarify which domains
are affected by automatic storytelling differences and whether
individuals with autism might show preserved or even enhanced
automatic storytelling in non-social tasks. Specifically, automatic
social storytelling could be uniquely affected because of an absence
of all automatic social processing in non-explicit tasks (e.g.,
[80,81]).
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In conclusion, we find that children with autism do not recruit
the same network of social and language regions as typically
developing children when performing a social judgment rather
than a physical judgment, despite similar behavioral performance.
Instead, the children with autism rely on a subset of the brain
regions used by children with typical development. This has two
major implications. First, it provides further evidence that typically
developing children recruit additional social and language regions
for relatively simple judgments, even when they are not strictly
required for task performance. These findings also provide an
interesting addition to previous reports that typically developing
adults recruit more language areas even when a given task does
not necessitate it for performance, showing a preference for
linguistic over visual strategies [69–71]. This preference towards
using a more complex strategy may thus be extended to the social
domain. Second, it suggests that abnormal functioning in the IFG,
mPFC, and temporal poles in autism does not correspond to
inferior task performance, which is particularly important for
understanding the roles of these areas in social cognition in autism.
The previous reports of decreased behavioral performance on
social judgment tasks by individuals with autism (e.g., [9,11,14])
could be accounted for by the increased difficulty inherent in these
tasks, including verbalization of decision criteria, which may result
in the need for these regions. Children with autism may recognize
socially inappropriate behavior but may not automatically use
language to encode this understanding, making expression and
generalization of this knowledge more difficult for them. Future
research could address this issue by examining the interaction of
task difficulty and performance with brain activity on this task in
individuals with and without autism.
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